This article investigates the diversity of the boards of directors of Brazilian companies listed on the BM&FBovespa with respect to gender, age, educational attainment and independence, to ascertain whether there is a relationship between any of these diversity measures and firm performance. The study covers all companies without majority control, a type of corporate structure that first appeared in Brazil in 2005. The results indicate that greater diversity in the educational disciplines and the presence or absence of independent board members negatively affect performance, while diversity in years of schooling has a positive effect. The presence of women board members is small, but firms that have at least one female director outperform those that do not.
INTRODUCTION
he great conflict in the field of corporate governance is that between shareholders and managers, the agency problem. Jensen & Meckling (1976) analyzed this problem from the standpoint of ownership structure theory. The company is a legal fiction, in which contractual relationships are established and through which assets are purchased and sold without the interference of all interested parties. In particular there is an agency relationship between the principals (shareholders) and the agents (managers). The agents can appropriate resources from the firm or not exert the necessary effort to create value for the shareholders. The principals can limit the effects of this divergence of interests by establishing controls, but this means incurring costs for auditing and information systems as well as demanding that the board of directors be formed of members that properly look out for the shareholders' interests.
The board of directors is therefore the key body to monitor the firm's management. Fama & Jensen (1983) examined the aspects of the separation between ownership and control and the board's monitoring activity, stressing that to be effective in protecting shareholder interests, the board "must always have the power to hire, fire and compensate the top-level decision managers and to ratify and monitor important decisions" (Fama & Jensen, 1983, p. 311 The purpose, composition and functioning of the board of directors are among the governance aspects most discussed by executives, directors, investors, regulators and commentators. Books, articles, consultants and gurus teach the best practices to be adopted (Bech, Jenkinson & Mayer, 2005) .
Nevertheless, all the emphasis on best practices and improving the functioning of boards did not prevent the occurrence of spectacular corporate meltdowns, such as the ignominious cases of Enron and Worldcom at the start of the millennium. And even if those episodes can be classified as outliers due to the glaring criminal behavior of those involved, the global crisis that hit with a vengeance in 2008 is full of occurrences of agency problems of huge proportion. Hundreds of financial institutions either failed or teetered on the brink, destroying shareholder value and drastically shrinking the credit market, and in the final analysis, the entire global economy. The financial crisis once again brought to the fore the question of why the directors of those institutions were unable to foresee the problems that resulted from excessive risk exposure (Rost & Osterloh, 2009 (Sadia S.A, 2008) , both of which suffered huge losses from positions in derivatives, driving them to the verge of bankruptcy, from which the only escape was to be taken over by competitors.
The objective of this article is to investigate the composition of the boards of directors of listed Brazilian firms without majority control regarding the variables of gender, age, education and independence or not of their members, to ascertain whether there is a relationship between these aspects and the market performance, and if so, the direction of that influence. This study is the first of its type in Brazil. The reason for choosing companies without majority control is that for them the agency problem is present in the classic form defined by Jensen & Meckling (1976) and Fama & Jensen (1983) : the conflict between executives and shareholders, with the board of directors playing the pivotal role for mediation and control. control (still the predominant pattern in Brazil), the agency problem shifts to the relationship between the majority and minority shareholders.
The main contribution of this article is to present evidence that greater diversity with respect to educational specialization (college degree discipline) and in the presence or absence of independent board members negatively affects the firms' results, while diversity in the number of years of schooling has a positive effect. The results also suggest that despite the small presence of women directors, firms that have at least one female board member have significantly better market performance than those that do not.
This article is organized into five sections including this introduction. Section 2 summarizes the previous studies on which ours is based and presents the research hypotheses; section 3 describes the database and the research methodology; section 4 presents the results; and section 5 concludes.
BOARDS OF DIRECTORS AND DIVERSITY
In recent years a growing number of studies have stressed the need for a more indepth examination of the behavioral processes that occur within and surrounding boards for a better understanding of the necessary conditions for effective corporate governance.
These studies are distributed among various disciplines and use a variety of methods and assumptions, so that the "behavioral" study of boards is not yet a coherent alternative to the perspective of agency theory (Van Aes, Grabrielsson & Huse, 2009 usually wind up taking a more extreme position, in the direction of their inclinations, than they had before starting to deliberate. This is a pattern that is not limited to a particular era, nation or culture. On the contrary, it is present in hundreds of studies involving scores of countries.
The members of a group will tend to extremism, and if the group is dominated by self-confident people, it will move in the same direction. The defense against extremism is a system of freedom of expression, diversity of opinions and checks and balances, in which one power counteracts another (Sunstein, 2009 an unbiased decision-making process tends to maintain decision makers in balance.
The multicultural vision first reached the field of education, more precisely in schools in the United States, in the 1960s, and according to Ogbu (1992) fostered the pride of minorities, helping students develop a new view of their culture, and reduced prejudices and stereotypes. In companies, the first approach was in the direction of diversity of the workforce. In the area of management, Robinson & Dechant (1987) argued that diversity, with emphasis on the presence of women, would improve the growth perspectives by improving comprehension of markets and increasing creativity, innovation and quality in the solution of problems, besides facilitating the relationship with the natural cultural diversity of global markets.
The concern over diversity on boards is not recent, although the literature is still scanty. Based on the literature suggesting that diversity would affect the dynamics of groups, improving the decision-making process, Erhardt, Werbel & Sharader (2003) investigated the impact of board diversity on the performance of 112 large listed American who using samples composed of MBA students concluded that women on average are more averse to risk than men in making financial decisions.
One of the important aspects of these results is that they were obtained with data on listed American firms without a majority controller, where the agency problem is essentially between executives and stockholders, with the board of directors having the function of mediation and control. When a company has a majority controller or controlling group, the fundamental governance problem is the controller's possible opportunism in detriment to the minority shareholders (Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY

Data
The existence of companies without majority control (a single controller or controlling group subject to a shareholder agreement) is a new phenomenon in the Brazilian capital market, a paradigm shift (Gorga, 2008) . The first such listed company in Despite the dispersion of a significant part of the shares in the market, many of these companies still have a single shareholder or organized group of shareholders that exercises some power of control due to the size of the holding. This situation was presented in classic form by Jensen & Meckling (1976) , who modeled their theory of the ownership structure starting from a situation in which the owner and manager are the same to that in which the owner floats shares in the market. If, for example, 60% of the shares are dispersed in the market, the managers/shareholders can spend $1 in their own benefit but only have to pay 40 cents. If 80% of the shares are dispersed in the market, the unproductive expense in benefit of managers will only cost 20 cents, and will cost managers nothing when all the capital is dispersed. In the case of our sample, it is possible that in some firms the composition of the board is still determined partly by shareholders with substantial control power, possibly preventing the board from exercising its oversight role completely in favor of all the shareholders. This can also occur at the extreme in c) Director independence: We used the same sources as in the previous item.
We considered the classification of independent declared by the company, according to the rules of the New Market listing segment of the BM&FBovespa. These rules consider a board member to be independent when he or she does not have and has not had any connection with the company over the past three years, is not a controlling The average Tobin's q of the sample was 1.14, meaning that the value of the companies according to the classic concept in corporate finance, including not only the market value of its shares, but also the value of the net debt, was 14% greater than the value of the assets. Table 1 The average percentage of independent board members was 40.3%. The explanation for the high percentage is that the New Market listing rules require that 20% of the board members be independent. The average number of board members was 6.9, with a total of 488 directors for the sample firms. The fact of being listed in the New Market also influenced this result because according to its rules, the board must be composed of at least five members, while the general rule for listed corporations in Brazil is at least three relationship between greater or lesser participation of independent board members and market performance. In contrast, here we estimated how the diversity of composition, measured by the ratio between independent and non-independent directors, affects firm performance.
In line with the observations of Harrison & Klein (2007) that the composition of different types or sources of information, knowledge or experience among the members of groups can be best represented by the indexes of Blau or Teachman (entropy), we defined the following diversity index:
In the above formula (1), P i,j,t is the proportion of the board members of firm i on date t that belong to category j; and k is the number of possible categories, given the board size or nature of the variable measured. We standardized D i,t through division by the theoretical maximum value, given by ((k − 1)/K), so that for any of the five variables the minimum value is zero (total homogeneity) and the maximum is 1 (maximum diversity).
The variables and parameters for estimating the diversity index are described e) Diversity index for independence ( independence i,t ): the directors of firm i were classified into two categories: 1 -independent, 2 -non-independent, so that the number of categories (k) was 2. An index of 1 would indicate that the members were equally divided between independent and non-independent, and zero if all were either independent or not independent. and ratio between independent and non-independent directors. 
Method for measurement of the relationship between board diversity and firm performance
We used regression analysis for the investigation, based on the following equation (2), developed from the models of Carter et al. (2008) , Ararat, Aksu & Cetin (2010) and Bar, Niessen & Ruenzi (2007) , originally constructed to measure the impact of the diversity of asset management teams on the performance of investment funds.
qtobin i,t = a + /3 1 years_education i,t-1 + /3 2 educational_disciplines i,t-1 + + /3 3 gender i,t-1 + /3 4 age i,t-1 + /3 5 independence i,t-1 + P n r i,t-1 + P m <P i,t-1 + E it
The variable qtobin i,t measures the market performance of firm i in year t. The levels of diversity in years of schooling, educational discipline, gender, age and independence of the board members in year t-1 are measured, respectively, by the variables years_education i,t-1 , educational_disciplines i,t-1 gender i,t-1 , age i,t-1 and iindependence i,t-1 , in the form of the diversity indexes. As detailed in item 3.1, we considered that the board composition at the end of the previous year t-1, including any changes made in the first four months of the year (up to April 30th, the last date for holding the annual general meeting), influenced the firm's performance in year t, as reflected in Tobin's q, estimated from the financial statements at the end of year t. Finally, r is the vector of control variables that can affect the market performance and <P is the vector of dummy variables representing the years.
The vector r was constructed to avoid the omission from the model of variables that could have affected the firms' market performance. We identified five variables. The first two, return on assets (roa) and the logarithm of total assets (log_assets), as proposed by Carter et al. (2008) , have the objective of maintaining each firm's characteristics constant. Return on assets is related to net revenue and book value per share, with predictive power on Tobin's q (Carter, Simkins & Simpson, 2003) , while the firm size, in this case measured by the value of total assets, is used as a control variable because it is associated with the return on the shares (Fama & French, 1993) .
The other three variables measure aspects of the governance structure. The first of them is the number of board members (board_size), associated negatively with the firm's market performance: the larger the board, the worse the market performance (Yermack, 1996 when the same person is the chief executive officer and the chairman of the board, and 1 otherwise. Carter et al. (2008) argued that the combination of these positions can be associated with worse financial performance. We included the third variable, the percentage of free float shares (free float), as a proxy for the board's power to influence the company's management, since the larger the free float of voting shares, the lower will be the chance of shareholders with large stakes to exercise control. We did not use dummy variables to indicate the firms' economic sectors due to the small sample size and the fact that all the companies were in individual sectors, with the exception of the real estate sector (seven firms) and management software sector (two firms). The dummy variables to identify sectors were not significant in preliminary tests, so we excluded them from the final model.
As advocated by the research on groupthink, the absence of new insights and diverging opinions can be crucial factors causing misguided decisions. Decisions of the board of directors without a careful analysis for definition of the firm's guidelines can have a negative impact on its market performance. Therefore, we tested the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis H0: The diversity of the board of directors does not affect the firm's market performance. As explained above, the board diversity was represented separately by years of schooling, educational discipline, gender, age and independence of the board (with the aim of measuring the impact of each diversity aspect), while performance was measured by Tobin's q. 0.62).
RESULTS
Diversity of years of schooling. The H0 was rejected at the 10% level. The estimator indicated a positive relationship between Tobin's q and diversity in years of schooling. Since the average diversity of the sample firms was intermediate (Table 2 ) and the average number of years of schooling was concentrated at the baccalaureate level (Table 1) , it can be argued that there would be increased effectiveness of boards if their members had more varied years of schooling.
Diversity of educational discipline. The results show a negative relationship between diversity in areas of educational specialization of board members and firm performance, which cannot be rejected at the 5% level. Therefore, firms with boards formed of people with diverse educational backgrounds would perform worse, a conclusion counter to the arguments developed in this study about the positive effects of diversity. We can suggest an explanation for this result. As can be seen in Table 2 , the average diversity of the firms in the sample is high, so it can be suggested that while the boards are formed of members with varied educational areas, some of these disciplines do not give the directors the skills necessary to understand the firm's business activities. In this case, the variable could be partially capturing the effects of another variable that is omitted but negatively correlated with it, namely the capacity of the directors to understand the firm's activities and provide input with authority at meetings of the board and its committees. The observation of Zingales (2000) can be mentioned here, that in the "new firm", competition at the global leve demands a process of innovation in search of quality, which can only be generated by telented employees. This requires technically qualified leadership. It is possible that the board members only manage to make a positive contribution to the results if they are capable at the strategic and monitoring levels with technical qualification. 
Diversity of gender.
With respect to gender diversity of the board members, it was not possible to reject the hypothesis that this diversity item does not affect the firm's market performance. Therefore, at first it cannot be affirmed that the findings of Carter, Simkins & Simpson (2002) and Carter et al. (2008) for American companies, that the presence of women on board has a positive impact on market performance, also apply to Brazilian companies without a majority controller. However, the results are coherent with those of Adams & Ferreira (2009) , which also were not conclusive about the presence of women on boards, nearly always formed in the majority by men.
We should stress that the gender diversity index of Brazilian firms is very low, with men making up the overwhelming majority: of the 71 boards observed during the study period, only 20 had a least one woman. Table 4 shows the comparison of the averages of the variables for the boards with and without women. T-tests of the differences of means showed that they are significant at the 5% level for Tobin's q and return on assets. By this comparison of the means, the market performance is boosted by having at least one female board member. It is also possible to conclude from Table 4 that those companies had a higher free float percentage in the study period. These results raise a possibility, suggested by some authors, like Demsetz & Villalonga (2001) , that there is an endogenous relationship between firm performance and ownership structure -and governance -in which the firm's performance has just as great a chance of affecting the ownership structure as the latter, among other factors, has in determining performance. We can thus suggest that firms with better performance are more likely to invite women to join the boards. 
Diversity of independence.
The hypothesis that the diversity between independent and independent directors does not affect performance was rejected at the 5% level, demonstrating that this is an aspect that affects the market performance, but in negative form. Although the literature contains contradictory results in relation to the presence of independent board members, in this case, as in the example of the diversity in educational disciplines, the possibility can be considered that the presence of independent directors, with deficient knowledge about their firms' business activities, might detract from performance. Once again, the results might be different with the inclusion of a variable to measure the capacity of directors to understand business matters specific to their firms.
Another possibility is that the firms' dispersed ownership structure -the average free float of the sample is 73.6%, as shown in Chart I -is leading to entrenchment of management, including the independent directors, who look out more for their own interests or those of the top executives. Santos, Silveira & Barros (2009) , for example, identified the existence of social ties among directors that sit on the boards of multiple firms (board interlocking), with a negative effect on firm value.
Control variables.
Of the control variables, the board size was not statistically significant at the 5% level. The observation made by Yermach (1996) that larger boards impair the market performance does not seem to hold for the Brazilian market. The free float percentage was significant at 5%, indicating a positive, albeit small, effect on performance with increased share dispersal in the market. There was also statistical significance, at the 10% level, for the variables roa (return on assets) and log_assets (logarithm of total assets), the first with a positive coefficient and the second with a negative one.
The variable regarding combination or not of the positions of CEO and board chairman in the same person was significant at 5%, with a coefficient of -0.011. The separation of the two positions would have a negative effect on the market performance, a result that contradicts the recommendations of most codes of good governance practices.
None of the dummy variables was statistically significant -the hypothesis of coefficients equal to zero could not be rejected for any of them -indicating there was no impact of the years from 2007 to 2009 on Tobin's q. This is a surprising result considering that these were years during which the financial crisis unfolded, which severely affected stock prices.
CONCLUSIONS
The empirical results from this study of listed Brazilian companies without majority control indicate there is a relationship between diversity of educational aspects of the board members and the firm's market performance, although in different directions (positive for years of schooling and negative for educational disciplines). Diversity regarding the composition between independent and non-independent directors also was significant, with a negative impact on performance. Finally, the presence of women board members in the sample was very small, but those firms with at least one female director presented significantly better market performance than those without any women on their boards.
The results have implications for improvement of corporate governance in Brazil.
The emergence of companies without a majority controller is usually associated with the implementation of the New Market. It is no accident that all the firms meeting this This study presented in this article has some limitations. The sample size is small, although covering all the listed companies without majority control up to the time of the study. The estimation of negative relationships between board diversity in the educational disciplines and in the combination of independent and non-independent directors with firm performance, measured by Tobin's q, can be an indication that we omitted variables from the model, one of them measuring the qualification of the directors regarding level of knowledge of the particular firm's business area.
We therefore recommend further research on the themes developed here, with the inclusion of more recent data. It would also be desirable to find proxies for the omitted variable mentioned above.
